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Combat Crew

strategic air command

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DECEMBER 1979

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**Brig Gen Thomas G. Darling,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, SAC**

A LICENSE TO JUDGE YOUR FELLOW "PERSON"

Our weapon systems, buildings, vehicles, computers, and such, cost millions to acquire and maintain. However, when it counts, the "actual value" of our hardware is measured by the ability and motivation of the human beings who fly, drive, maintain, operate, or just stand ready to go. Too often we fail to appreciate the awesome responsibility of the people resources given to us to manage. We keep our aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment in the best possible working order. But, can we honestly say that we are giving the same degree of attention to our people?

As the designated supervisor over another person, a crew, or an office staff, we owe the Air Force at least equal, if not greater, attention to the protection and preservation of human assets as we give to the hardware. Let's extend this analogy a bit further and consider a unique feature of people — that is, their value increases rather than depreciates over time. The new troop in your unit may be CINCSAC or the Air Force Chief of Staff, someday. How high he or she climbs the ladder of success or whether or not they even "stay-on" is largely up to you.

One of the many tools we supervisors/commanders use to manage our people resources is the OER. Through it, we attempt to describe the performance and potential of a fellow human over a 4-12 month period of observation. We curse when the "shell is received from The CBPO, groan when the OER monitor calls to say the suspense is up, and write the report during commercials while watching "Charlie's Angels." Later, we "gratefully accept" the squadron commander's or OER monitor's recommendations for improving the report. A few minutes spent on proposed indorsements and you're off the hook for a few more weeks or months.

If the above sounds familiar to you, count yourself among those who are only giving lip service to the "people are our most important resource" principle. Writing OERs is not an easy task and writing "effective ones" (excuse the pun) is really a challenge. Whether you are working on your first OER or have written 50, doing it right takes research, careful word choices, and your very best "effective writing" skills.

As the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, I see thousands of reports each year. From that vantage point I assure you that no one has fully mastered the art, but the extent of effort put into each report soon becomes quite obvious. Likewise, selection board members quickly "get a feel" for the "quality" of a report.

If you're still with me at this point, count yourself among those who "do care" and let's explore ways to write a "good" OER. First, get started as soon as you are notified or know that one is due. Begin by making a list of the ratee's accomplishments. It is not improper, in fact it is recommended, to ask the ratee to give you a list of accomplishments. Make it clear that you don't expect them to write the OER; but rather, to list achievements which would fit into Section III of the AF Form 707. This way you should end up with several good examples for each of the officer's qualities and can choose the ones your experience indicates to be the most important or significant.

Before you put pen to paper, stop and consider "who you are writing to." Primarily, that will be "selection board members." Remember that at best, only one SAC officer will be on each nomination/selection board panel. So, assume that the reader knows little or nothing about your aircraft, missiles, or particular job. Then as you write, translate the day-to-day terminology of your professional vocabulary into terms a board member with no SAC experience can understand and appreciate.

Be factual and specific in Section III (performance factors). Keep in mind that you establish or lose credibility as an evaluator by how well you

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support your ratings. If you've under-supported the ratings on performance, your evaluation of potential will not be as effective. This is more important than ever since decontrol of ratings on potential.

Spend considerable time on the job description. Remember that many "significant" users of the report are not familiar with the nature and complexity of SAC duties. Check in your organization for good examples of descriptions. It's smart, not plagiarism, to use the best you can find.

The primary goal of your comments in Section VI should be to support and verbally describe the rating you gave on potential in Section V. What is the evidence to support your judgment that the ratee has either great or limited potential for more responsibility? Some raters use a "theme" approach here very effectively. That is, they use this space to elaborate the officer's "strongest qualification" or to say, why the ratee would be a good choice for a career enhancing opportunity. Above all, don't fail to include your recommendation for career advancement. If the officer is ready for promotion or merits selection for regular — this is where board members will look for your opinion. Therefore, it's a good idea to end this portion of the report with an "enthusiastic," eye-catching expression of what you want the board to do!

Unless your supervisor has told you otherwise, write proposed indorsements for the additional rater and indorser. They normally are busy people and not as familiar with the ratee as you are. They may use, reject, or modify your proposals, but always will appreciate your help. The indorser's comments are probably the most important part of an OER and deserve your best effort. Experienced OER writers often save one or two of the officer's strongest accomplishments to go into the indorser's comments. Promotion, augmentation, and reassignment recommendations are "a must" here.

If the report is the first, or among the first, you've written, ask someone with more experience to critique your effort. It's very easy to make sincere comments which you intend to be favorable, only to find out later that they carry a negative connotation for other people.

Whether you are reporting outstanding, mediocre, or substandard performance, writing OERs is among the most important responsibilities you will be given during your Air Force career. Beyond an accurate evaluation of a personnel resource for commanders, managers, and selection board use, your OERs represent "the system's" recognition of a ratee's performance for as much as a year on the job.

Perhaps the best advice I can leave you with is to remember and follow the spirit of the "Golden Rule." Put into every report you write, the thorough and conscious effort which you would like to receive from your supervisor. ★

Combat Crew

Magazine of the Strategic Air Command · 30th Year of Publication

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ON OUR COVER

Seasons greetings from the staff of Combat Crew.

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COMBAT CREW is an internal publication of the Strategic Air Command with the sole purpose of promoting safety. The contents of this magazine are informative and not to be considered as directive in nature. Facts, testimony and conclusions of all mishaps printed herein may not be construed as incrimination under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. All names, dates and places used in conjunction with mishap stories are fictitous. Written permission must be obtained from Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, before any material may be reprinted by other than U.S. Air Force organizations. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Hq. USAF. Distribution FX, controlled by IGFC. SAC units submit distribution requests through local PDO.

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U.S. AIR FORCE
MENT WING
7TH BOMBA

TEAMWORK and EFFORT

Lt Col John P. Hopper
7 BMW/SE

. . . a look at the 7th Bomb Wing

On 1 October, the 7th BMW at Carswell AFB celebrated its 60th anniversary. As one of the oldest Air Force units, the 7th has a colorful and rich history which has emphasized teamwork as well as individual effort. The unit pioneered in air-to-air refueling and transportation on 1 January 1929, when the 7th Bombardment Group provided the ground and refueling support for the flight of Maj Carl Spaatz and Capt Ira Eaker, who set an endurance record of 150 hours 40 minutes and 15 seconds in a Fokker tri-motor aircraft named the "Question Mark." Also, on 22 May 1929, 1Lt Odos Moon of the group flew an LB-7 from Dayton, Ohio, to Washington, D.C. via New York to demonstrate air-to-air refueling.

After a distinguished WWII record which included action from Java and India, the group returned to the United States and was inactivated on 6 January 1946. It was reactivated on October 1, of the same year and assigned to Ft Worth Army Air Field (now Carswell AFB) as a Strategic Air Command unit. During the next ten years the group concentrated on its training mission. In April 1947, it flew 23 of its B-29s to Los Angeles as a part of an 8AF mass formation. In June 1948, it received its first B-36 aircraft and began to convert from the B-29 to the B-36 aircraft. During the next nine years, it participated in many global long distance exercises which demonstrated the capabilities of the B-36, the Peacemaker. The 7TH's B-36s carried the SAC shield throughout the world during these years, and participated in 24-hour ground and airborne alert operations, serving as a positive deterrent to Soviet aggression.

On 16 February 1951, the three squadrons assigned to the group were directly assigned to the 7th



BMW. Six years later, in June 1958, the wing received its first Boeing B-52, Stratofortress jet bomber, and began to convert from the B-36 to the B-52. By 1 January 1959, the wing completed the conversion and was nearly combat ready. Between 1959 and 1965, the 7th maintained its position as a member of the Strategic Air Command's nuclear strike force. The wing's primary mission during this period was air and ground alert activities. The wing continued to participate in SAC airborne alert indoctrination flights, which served as a major factor in the deterrence of communist aggression. During 1965 wing combat activity increased. In May, all aircraft and personnel assigned to the wing were deployed to the Pacific area and participated in the SAC ARC LIGHT bombing activities in Vietnam. The wing's B-52s were based at Andersen AFB, Guam, and its tankers were deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa. The wing remained in the Pacific until December 1965, continually participating in ARC LIGHT operations against the Viet Cong and earned the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for its performance in ARC LIGHT operations during this period.

When the wing returned to Carswell in December 1965, it resumed its role as a member of SAC's retaliatory force while some bomber and tanker crews continued to augment the ARC LIGHT bomber and YOUNG TIGER tanker forces in the Western Pacific. Four years later, the wing was once more directed to deploy with its aircraft and a large number of its personnel to the Pacific to participate in and to support ARC LIGHT operations. Deployed elements of the wing were assigned to the 3d Air Division.

The wing returned to Carswell in March 1971, and again resumed its tasks as a member of SAC's deterrent force. Throughout the year, the 7th BMW continued to support the conventional combat operations in Southeast Asia. By December 1972, support requirements for Southeast Asia had increased to unprecedented levels and the wing was tasked to provide additional personnel and equipment. At the end of the year, the 7th BMW participated in LINEBACKER II, the first strategic bombing missions ever flown by B-52s over North Vietnam. Crewmembers of the wing flew approximately 150 of the more than 700 LINEBACKER II bombing missions and the success of the operation paved the way for the signing of the Vietnam Peace Agreement which ended the war in January 1973. When the enemy began to redirect attacks into Laos and Cambodia later that year, SAC and the 7th BMW resumed combat missions over these countries and continued these missions until 15 August 1973, when all bombing in Southeast Asia stopped.

7th AIR REFUELING SQUADRON

CURRENT OPERATIONS

The structure of the 7th BMW is typical of other SAC heavy bombardment units; however, the number of active flying units and diversity of experience levels make the wing somewhat unusual. Four very active flying units are assigned to the 7th BMW: 9th Bomb Squadron, 20th Bomb Squadron, 7th Air Refueling Squadron, and the 4018 Combat Crew Training Squadron.

The 9th Bomb Squadron continues a tradition of aviation excellence that has existed from its organization on 14 June 1917 through 1979. During its history, the 9th has flown many diverse aircraft from the Sopwith Camel to the B-52. The 20th Bomb Squadron also has a distinguished history. The "Buccaneers" have the distinction of being the oldest continuous active duty bomb squadron in the Air Force, and was a participant in Gen Billy Mitchell's daylight bombing of a captured German battleship. The 7th AREFS, while not as old in time of service as the other two operational squadrons, has continued the aerial refueling firsts that were started in 1929 by the 7th Bomb Group. The 7th AREFS has the distinction of being the first unit to refuel the world's first supersonic bomber, the B-58 Hustler. The 7th AREFS crews have also provided refueling support as a routine measure during the YOUNG TIGER operation in the Southeast Asia conflict,

Continued on Page 18

SAFETY

a people program

Maj Stephen J. Miller
Editor

"Safety people cannot do the job behind their desks. They should get together with people day and night. They must be out on the flight line. They must be talking to local people in the community about safety practices . . . safety people must get one on one with . . . the whole spectrum of those people who are involved with safety awareness."

So stated Col George P. Tynan, SAC Deputy Inspector General in his keynote address to over 140 safety individuals from HQ Air Force, SAC and Air Reserve Force units gathered at Carswell AFB for SAC's annual safety management seminar.

Col Tynan commenting on the individual unit safety programs further stated, "Safety can be a very

Photos by SSGT Ramon H. Reyna
4235th STS, Carswell AFB

dynamic and invigorating thing on bases. You as safety officers must do your job and keep it alive. The one thing you need is your commander's support. He appointed you, you work for him; keep the lines of communication open; talk to him about things you want to do. Talk to him about things that you see. Get his support."

The seminar was opened on 2 October by Col Richard A. Patrick, SAC Director of Safety, when he challenged the safety professionals attending. "We have a challenge," he said. "The challenge is not to go home from here this week and say, 'I wish I had discussed that subject.' Bring up your problems; lay them out on the table; let's kick them around and see if we can enhance the effectiveness of our safety programs." Col Patrick's statement summed up the reason SAC's safety people meet at Carswell annually. The 4235th STS hosts the seminar in order to provide a forum to review safety problems and discuss ways to solve the problems to make safety programs more efficient and effective.

Brig Gen Garry A. Willard, Jr., Director of Aerospace Safety, AFISC, was the principle guest speaker during the opening session. He presented a comparison of SAC mishap rates to the overall Air Force rates and then went on to say, "I'm not a believer in the thought that as long as you are flying or as long as you are walking or as long as you are driving, you're going to have accidents. You know it

always happens to the other guy, doesn't it? Sometimes it doesn't happen to the other guy, it happens to you. The cost of mishaps last year in dollar figures, not to mention deaths or injury to people, was about $315 million. That's a third of a billion dollars. That's a lot of money and it represents a lot of resources that we can't apply to other areas."

Gen Willard also pointed out. "In flying safety we have three problems to address. These are collisions with the ground, flying a good airplane out of control, and poor coordination or nobody flying the airplane." He emphasized that to be effective in solving these problems as well as other safety problems, safety people must have a good creditability with people. Safety is a people program and works only through a constant dialogue with people. In closing,he left the group with three challenges to think about: "Get to your boss, get to your people, and get your program underway."

Attendees at the seminar represented 42 SAC units, Hq SAC and SAC NAFs, Hq AFRES, Directorate of Nuclear Surety, Ogden ALC, and the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center. Representatives from Hq SAC and the NAFs were directly responsible for the seminar agenda.

Safety people had the unique opportunity during this year's seminar to thoroughly review and provide inputs to the SAC Sup to AFR 127-2 which will be available in mid November. This supplement encompasses the SAC mishap prevention program and governs actions to be taken in the unit level mishap prevention programs. Other areas and problems discussed were safety manning and image, flying mishap investigations, PRP problems and changes, safety equipment problems, AFOSH standards and application, and civilian position upgrading.

Brig Gen Richard A. Burpee, SAC IG, in the closing session, emphasized that the present trends in mishaps in SAC must be curbed. He stated, "our job, our mission, our role in the Strategic Air Command, is just too important to lose a very capable weapon system. So, we've got to turn the trends around."

Gen Burpee pointed out that there have been some problems with job stability in the safety business which are being worked. He also related the jobs in Safety to promotions stressing that promotion boards are not interested so much in what job you are doing, but how well you are doing that job. "I know when I read personnel folders on promotion boards, I take a look at what job the man has, and then I take a look at the ratings and see how well he performed that job," he stated.

In his concluding remarks, Gen Burpee echoed Gen Ellis, saying, "Let's turn this business around about losing airplanes; let's maintain our nuclear security the way we have; let's try to figure out how to stop ground accidents; . . . and whatever we do, let's each try to do the very best we each know how to do . . . we have two resources to worry about. The first is people and the second concerns those air machines and weapons and missiles that were designed to go to the target and not fall short."

Col Patrick closed the conference by expressing his appreciation to the 4235th STS for their outstanding work in hosting the 1979 SAC Safety Management Seminar. "Once again, a good show all around."



Previously used hook with safety latch. This latch twisted and resulted in workcage disconnecting. (Called Reverifying Newton's Laws)



Improved system to hook up workcage, incorporated a U-bolt.

Captain Hook's SAFETY LATCH

Capt Jonathan B. Mullin
341SMW, Malmstrom AFB

A missile maintenance team member (MMT work cage man), working in a Minuteman launch tube became a confirmed believer of the safety belt and lanyard recently when the cage from which he was performing maintenance suddenly dropped from beneath his feet and crashed on the missile retaining ring, approximately 50 feet below. Hanging there by his safety belt and lanyard was a very surprised and shocked maintenance technician. "It happened so fast, the shock didn't hit me until an hour or two later," he said. "I was taping the missile guidance set (MGS) coolant lines to the umbilical cable, when the work cage dropped; I didn't realize I was hanging there those first few moments until the cage slammed into the ring. With the old adrenalin going through my pumper, I knew something had happened; it's an experience I don't want to repeat. I remember hooking the cage and checking the catch myself. It was alright then. I just felt very lucky," he concluded.

The team chief who was watching the maintenance operation, immediately reached from the launch tube access door (diving board), to his dangling team member and assisted him to safety.

The investigation of the incident revealed that the work cage fell due to a unique set of circumstances. After returning to the diving board, to allow another maintenance man to depart from the work cage, a slight amount of slack probably existed. Tests conducted on similar assemblies revealed that only one-half inch of slack or less is needed to allow the hook lip to move to a position on the work cage yoke from which it can slip off. When the UP button was pressed, the safety catch released and the yoke was loaded on the hook lip. This load configuration was sufficient to allow traversing around the launch tube wall. In our case the work cage disengaged the hook from the yoke, leaving our confirmed safety belt believer, hanging in there.

Tests conducted in conjunction with the investigation indicated that this particular set of circumstances could not be duplicated more than five percent of the time. However, the safety catch is made of a light gauge metal and needs only to be acted on by a relatively small force to permit disengagement.

This mishap happened in 1973; six years later in 1979 a similar hook mishap occurred. A missile maintenance team was dispatched to remove and replace a guidance and control unit (G&C). The reentry vehicle (RV) had been removed and stored in the RV van. The two topside members of the team were preparing to lower the G&C section hoisting

G&C lifting adapter becomes entangled in barrier set.

adapter which was attached to a four-foot extension. (A four-foot extension is required to be attached to the RV hoist assembly hook due to the modification of the missile suspension system). The G&C hoist adapter was being positioned over the RV van's open floor when it became entangled in the safety barrier ropes surrounding the RV van floor access doors. The G&C hoisting adapter slipped from positive connection and fell about 20 feet to the top of the G&C installed on the missile. The G&C adapter struck the G&C section damaging it and then bounced near the work cage technician who performed an athletic catch and precluded further possible damage to the missile.

During the investigation tests revealed that slack could disengage the safety latch similar to the 1973 mishap with the work cage. Also demonstrated was the fact that hooks have to be under "load" to prevent them from disconnecting given a slack cable situation. This same type safety latch is used with the RV hoist hook to raise and lower expensive equipment. The work cage hook safety latch was redesigned, but Captain Hook's safety latch continues in the inventory. As a result of the mishap recommendations we hope to get a murphy proof piece of hardware to preclude similar mishaps.

When twisted, a serviceable safety latch can easily disconnect.

DEBRIEF

SAC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

"In honor of those individuals of the Strategic Air Command who are missing in action or were killed while directly supporting combat operations in Southeast Asia," is the inscription which appears on a plaque donated to the Strategic Aerospace Museum at Bellevue, Nebraska.

Gen Richard H. Ellis, SAC commander in chief, made the formal presentation of the "SAC in Southeast Asia" exhibit to the museum on behalf of the U-Tapao Veterans Association.

During the presentation, Gen Ellis said, "The sounds of hostile fire have long since faded from the aerial battlefields of Southeast Asia and the tragedy known as Vietnam has become a distant and abstract memory for many Americans. But for those who fought there . . . for those who lost comrades there . . . for those who suffered there . . . the memories still remain. And so they should.

"For 12 long years, the men and women of SAC answered the nation's call 'to serve' and did all that their country asked of them. And they were more than equal to the challenge. Most came home — some did not — and others are still missing. With courage and with purpose, they did their job . . and they will not be forgotten."

Honoring 123 SAC people who are missing or were killed in action during the conflict, the exhibit consists of the plaque, photographs, patches, diaries, flight equipment and other remembrances donated by the U-Tapao Veterans Association and Southeast Asia veterans.

A PAPERBACK FOR TANKERS

Available through the Headquarters SAC Historian is an illustrated history of tanker operations during the SEA era written by Charles K. Hopkins. This publication tells the complete story of SAC tanker operations during that time. Copies of the book, *SAC Tanker Operations in the Southeast Asia War,* may be obtained by writing to: HQ SAC/HO, Offutt AFB NE 68113. The price is $3.62, and the check should be made out to Accounting & Finance Office (AFO), Offutt AFB.

Capt John R. Ingersoll (foreground) and 1Lt Lance S. Okimoto prepare to "turn keys" in the new 4ACCS Airborne Procedures Trainer, simulating ALCS launch of SAC's Minuteman missiles.

Airborne Procedures Trainer

Capt Jim Boensch
4ACCS, Ellsworth AFB

Remember the scene from the "Wizard of Oz", where Toto pulls back the curtain to reveal the Wiz frantically throwing switches, spinning dials and squawking over the PA system? Until recently, Instructors and Stan/Eval officers in the 4th Airborne Command Control Squadron's (4ACCS) Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) Branch could sympathize with his predicament. Saddled with an aging training device produced from salvaged equipment, they often spent as much time physically operating the trainer to insure proper weapon system status to the crew as they did in completing their primary objective of instructing or evaluating Airborne Missile Combat Crew procedures. "Heads Down", operators were required to frequently reference a special operating manual to accomplish a lengthy series of manual operations, which had to be timed to coincide exactly with the crew's actions. If the crew made a mistake, it was entirely up to the operator to override any automatic trainer responses and manually force on the proper indications, while attempting to observe crew actions.

Maintenance was a nightmare. No technical diagrams or schematics were available, since it was the only ALCS trainer in the world. A lone Training Device Technician faced each malfunction in a labyrinth of old, often-irreplaceable wiring and electrical relays. For years, liberal doses of initiative, imagination and perseverance kept the device operational.

Early in 1975, Air Force authorized procurement of two Airborne Launch Control System simulators, one for 4ACCS and one for 2ACCS at Offutt AFB. These two squadrons manage all SAC ALCS-equipped aircraft. The new Airborne Procedures Trainers (APTs) were to be computerized, providing realistic simulation of the complex weapon system as well as ease of maintenance. GTE Sylvania was awarded the contract, and in October 1977, crews from 4ACCS and 2ACCS participated in the Installation and Checkout/Interim Acceptance Demonstration at Needham, Mass. By August 1978, both trainers were operational.

Using a microprogrammed minicomputer, APT operation is almost entirely automatic. Responses to crew actions are fast and accurate. "Heads Up", instructors and evaluators are free from all but minimal status inputs to students and evaluatees. Captain Dan Benkert, Chief of the 4ACCS Operational Readiness Training (ORT) school said, "The new trainer represents a significant advancement in realistic training for ALCS crewmembers. Most of the thousands of functions performed by ALCS equipment on the aircraft can be reproduced authentically in the APT."

The ORT school provides initial ALCS training for all Airborne Missile Combat Crewmembers in SAC. It is one of a very few official Air Force schools operated at squadron level. All of its instructor/evaluators are also combat-ready ALCS crewmembers. Lt Col Charles C. Adams, 4ACCS Commander, serves as school commandant. The School's mission is to conduct recurring training and evaluation for more than 50 combat-ready ALCS crewmembers in the 4ACCS. This is an easier task with the new simulator. In addition, Battle Staff members receive regular communications training in the

APT.

The new trainer and facility that houses it were highly praised by the SAC IG during its April 1979 inspection. Their report stated that, "Although the APT has been in operation less than a year, the facility is a show place, and the programs conducted are outstanding in every respect."

"Realistic" best describes the APT. It looks, sounds and operates like the Airborne Launch Control Center in an EC-135 aircraft. Imagine a large blue metal box in an open bay of a building. Walking through an electronic-emission controlled door, the trainer divides in two. To the left, on an elevated floor, is the control room or operator's cab, with the computer and two operator's panels. Surprisingly small, the computer and associated equipment is contained in only two racks of equipment. In contrast, the cab itself is roomy. Environmentally controlled, it is an operator's dream. The Trainer Operational Program and individual lesson plans are read into the computer through a programmed cassette tape. The operator controls the trainer through a Video Display Terminal, a combination cathode ray tube/keyboard, advancing to new problem sequences, or repeating previous problems. Crewmembers are observed through one-way glass that extends the length of trainer. Downstairs on the floor of the APT, students solve complicated equipment problems and perform EWO sequences in an atmosphere of striking realism. ALCS equipment in the trainer can be readily reconfigured to simulate either an EC-135C or G-model aircraft.

The average trainer session lasts four hours. Three hours are devoted to simulating uploading an aircraft to alert status, rigorously exercising the crew's ability to monitor status and solve malfunctions. In their upload, the crews "Follow the Yellow Brick Road", a nickname for the sequence used to verify proper equipment operation and security from electronically divulging classified code material. Weapon System Safety Rules are stressed. Every indicator the crew monitors has a duplicate in the cab, enabling operators to stay ahead of the crew, while closely following their actions. An hour-long EWO sequence completes the period with the crew exercising their dual responsibilities of airborne command and control and providing a backup launch capability for Minuteman wings.

The ORT school is responsible for all trainer maintenance. This is a totally inhouse effort. The school's five enlisted trainer maintenance personnel, operating from a modern, expanded maintenance area, were described by the recent SAC IG as, "Professional and dedicated to providing quality support. The high morale and teamwork displayed by the maintenance technicians has allowed a smooth transition into a fully operational maintenance program." Through their diligence, there have been only seven hours of scheduled training time lost due to trainer down-time since its installation almost a year ago.

4ACCS is rightfully proud of its new trainer and ORT facility. ALCS crewmembers, ranging in rank from 1st Lieutenant through Major, point with pride to their accomplishments during the transition period. Their professionalism was reflected in the words of the Inspector General: "The ALCS Branch is doing an outstanding job of supporting the PACCS (Post Attack Command Control System) mission. All areas inspected were virtually error-free."

The modern-day "Wizards" of ALCS still "Follow the Yellow Brick Road" to success, but the frantic days in the trainer are over, thanks to computer magic and the dedication of 4ACCS people.

The old order changeth, but SSgt Thomas M. Merring, the only remaining APT Technician who worked with the previous trainer, still finds use for his soldering iron. Only seven hours of scheduled training time have been lost due to trainer downtime since installation of the new APT. (Photos by SSgt William D. Jewell)

TSgt Barry K. Shafer, ALCS Procedures Trainer Technician, inserts the Trainer Operational Program cassette tape in the computer tape drive unit, preparation for the day's training. The computer and associated equipment are contained in only two racks of equipment.

Editor's note. The IP killed in the recent KC-135 crash at Castle was a close personal friend of the author. This article is an attempt to provide a word picture of events following the tragedy. The pilot's widow reviewed the article and stated that she hoped it would be published in the interest of flight safety.

An

She quivered as I held her. Slowly, I drew her closer to me in a vain attempt to steady her. She buried her tear-drenched face in my shoulder. "Please fly safe," she whispered, "I want to hear all about your trip when you get home."

My mind flashed back to the macabre series of events which preceded our embrace. For I was holding another man's wife, and a few thousand feet from where we stood lay the charred and mangled remains of the airplane which incinerated her husband and four others. It was my duty to escort the small bronze urn containing the ashes of my friend to its final resting place. This was to be his last flight.

The past week had been the nightmare that always happens to "other people." I was wading through the paperwork on my desk when we heard rumors of a crash. A friend in the office said, "I hope it's nobody I know. On second thought, I hope it's nobody."

Selfishly, I felt the same way. Air crashes never seem so horrifying when you're not personally involved. It's easy to sit back with your feet on the coffee table while the TV news team provides action shots and commentary of the tragedy. Our enormous pilot egos falsely reassure us we could never be the subject of those gruesome scenes on the TV screen. After all, we're good, experienced and highly trained. We can handle about anything in an airplane, or can we?

My friend was good, highly trained and experienced, with above average air sense. Yet I was standing on the flight line with his widow in my arms, and all the safety meetings, articles and lectures could not prepare me for the incredible emptiness of that moment. Her husband, my friend was dead. Nothing I could do or say could ease her pain or erase her loneliness.

Relatives and friends had journeyed from all over the country to offer their support and pay their respects. As each person arrived, I was eventually asked the same question, "How could this happen to such a good pilot?"

Is anyone so good that they can survive any-

ther man's
WIFE

Capt Ron Sams
93 AREFS, Castle AFB



situation that might occur in an airplane? From engine start to shutdown, are we really prepared to handle what might happen? As we stood on the flight line that day, my mind began an instant replay of my experiences in an airplane. As if running a tape machine on fast forward, I began to index my own close calls.

As a new aircraft commander, an alert flight line supervisor prevented me from taking off with a flat tire. A few months later, I almost had a midair collision after refueling, due to a misunderstanding in ATC clearances. Then there was the time I allowed my copilot to fly a flat, dragged-in approach and we almost landed in the overrun. Feeling terribly complacent one day, I watched as another copilot attempted a landing in a 15 knot crosswind. Everything looked great until he stomped the wrong rudder during the landing flare. I barely got the low wing up before we hit the runway. As an IP, I once failed to prevent a pilot from applying incorrect rudder following a simulated engine failure. We rolled to 50 degrees of bank before I could take the airplane away and regain control. Luckily, we were at traffic pattern altitude when I made that mistake.

I had convinced myself that I am alive today because of my own aeronautical skill. Now I wonder how much of my skill is really luck. If I had been the IP that day instead of my friend, would he now be standing on the flight line with my wife?

Sooner or later, we all have emergencies or close calls, and these situations contribute to our mental library of "There I was . . ." stories. Reflecting back, some appear humorous as we practice one-upmanship in storytelling at the bar, the brutal fact is that there is nothing humorous about making mistakes in airplanes, especially when lives are involved.

We pay a lot of lip service in flying safety meetings about learning from other's mistakes, but do we ever really admit to ourselves that we are just as vulnerable as the next person? Must complacency grow larger than our experience? The events of this week have stripped away a large coating of my overconfidence. But why should it take the death of a close friend to do that? Shouldn't I be just as morally outraged when any aircraft mishap results in fatalities?

As she said goodbye, my knees grew weak, and I began to shake. Every nerve in my body seemed numb. My friend was not a war hero, and he would never have discovered a cure for cancer, or solved the energy crisis. But he was a decent human being, and a loving husband and father. I learned a lot from him, and I'm proud of our friendship.

"Please fly safe." she whispered again through her tears. I nodded my head, but I wasn't so sure. You see, I'm not as sure I'm as good a pilot as I thought I was last week.

TEAMWORK AND EFFORT

Continued from Page 7



supported tanker task forces worldwide and provided the emergency refueling capability for modern aircraft such as the F/FB-111 and F-16 produced across the Carswell runway at General Dynamics' Ft Worth Division.

Although the 4018th CCTS, activated in 1974, is the newest flying unit in the 7th BMW, it is very dynamic and has been instrumental in the production and maintenance of high quality B-52D flight crews. Initially the men and women of the 4018th CCTS functioned as a replacement training unit for G and H model crews in preparation for their ARC LIGHT participation. They now train UPT and UNT graduates as well as young gunners, in addition to upgrading PUP and NUP students as professional aircraft commanders and radar navigators. Recently the B-52D Wing and Division Commanders course was implemented. The widely acclaimed B-52D and KC-135 Central Flight Instructor Course trains one-third of all SAC instructors including ANG and AFRES instructors.

Rounding out the operations complex of the 7th BMW are the staff agencies supporting the combat crews and instructors. While the office symbols and various agency names are similar to those of any other B-52 wing, the effort expended and challenges mastered are truly exceptional. Indicative of these challenges are the efficient scheduling and use of over 20,000 flying hours per year in accomplishment of SIOP training in addition to 10,000 annual contingency training events. Accurate and timely maintenance of over 700 individual flight records also presents a prodigious task. The 7th BMW Operations Division provides support and expertise to aid the crews in fulfilling the demands of training required to maintain a high level of proficiency, both offensively and defensively in the nuclear and conventional role. Standardization of operations and adherence to the demanding requirements levied on the 7th BMW are measured by the Standardization Evaluation Division. The administration of over 1000 flight evaluations each year and flawless completion of the associated paper work are accomplished by six B-52D crews, three KC-135 crews, two instructor teams from the 4018th CCTS and three administrative personnel.

The men and women of the maintenance complex have provided the best B-52D aircraft possible to meet the mission requirements of the 7th Bomb Wing. Requirements include the production of an average of 165 B-52 and 78 KC-135 sorties each month. Additionally, personnel of the 7th BMW maintenance team provide the airframes required for the SIOP Alert Force. In any review, this is a



tough job done by tough professionals. These accomplishments do not occur without considerable effort, skillful work and superior managerial skill at each level of responsibility. The results of the typical 7th BMW maintenance effort are reflected in the 7th FMS being selected as the Best in SAC for 1977 and more recently, the unparalleled achievement of two perfect loads coupled with error-free special tools as the 7th MMS Loading Team won another Best in SAC at the 1979 GIANT SWORD Competition.

Through teamwork and dedicated effort the men and women of the 7th Bomb Wing welcome the challenges presented. Just two of many challenging situations confronting the wing today is the work associated with the Planar Wing and Cruciform Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) and the long-awaited Digital Bombing and Navigation System (DBNS) for the B-52D. In addition, the teamwork and competitive spirit were also displayed in a very positive way through participation in both the 1978 and 1979 fall exercises conducted by NATO. Maintenance, operations, and support personnel performed in an outstanding manner both years. The men and women of the 7th Bomb Wing take pride in meeting the challenges of today and vow to continue their proud tradition.

— Thanks to SSgt Sheralyn Wharton, 7BMW Historian and personnel from Operations, Maintenance and Support for contributions to this article.

SAC assumes operational management for
SPACE SURVEILLANCE AND MISSILE WARNING RESOURCES

Brigadier General William L. Shields, Jr.
DCS/Space Surveillance and Missile Warning Systems (SX)



Following more than two years of planning, consultation and negotiation, the Strategic Air Command assumed a new and major responsibility — overall operational management for this country's current and future space surveillance and missile warning resources. This new responsibility is the result of the 1 October 1979 reorganization of the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM). Operational management of the air defense segment was assumed by the Tactical Air Command while the Air Force Communications Service assumes maintenance responsibility for the associated communications. In its role as operational manager for space surveillance and missile warning, SAC is responsible for organizing, training, equipping and operating the assigned resources.

Under the reorganization, SAC will gain major installations at Peterson AFB, CO, Sondrestrom AB and Thule AB, Greenland, as well as 20 smaller units, and approximately 3900 personnel. The gained units are located at facilities throughout the Continental United States and around the globe, and are aligned with SAC's Numbered Air Forces and Air Divisions on a geographical basis.

There were a number of reasons for the reorganization. Primarily it centered around the need for



more streamlined and centralized management. From an economic standpoint, the reorganization is projected to save nearly 800 manpower spaces and $13 million annually.

At SAC headquarters, the gained ADCOM resources are managed by the newly created Deputy Chief of Staff for Space Surveillance and Missile Warning Systems (DCS/SX). Brigadier General William L. Shields, Jr., recently transferred from Andrews AFB, MD where he served as the Air Force Systems Command Inspector General, heads up this new staff organization. General Shields recently emphasized that, "while SAC will assume operational management responsibility, operational control of air defense and space surveillance and missile warning assets will be retained by the Commander-in-Chief, North America Air Defense Command."

During the next few months, personnel will be transferring to HQ/SAC at Omaha from ADCOM Headquarters at Colorado Springs and sensor sites around the world. They will bring with them vast experience that will ensure this vital element of national defense continues effective throughout the transfer and beyond.

CFIC Corner

SECRET MANEUVERS DISCLOSED (Part 1)

Attention: Boom Operators, Tanker Pilots, and Bomber Pilots

Captain Dayre C. Lias
Central Flight Instructor Course
Castle AFB, CA 95342

"I'm sure looking forward to flying here at CFIC, so I can finally see all those secret air refueling demonstrations." It is very disheartening to the CFIC instructor cadre when an instructor candidate says something similar to this. The word is obviously not getting out. Hopefully, after reading CFIC Corner, you too will be one of the priviledged few with knowledge of the "secret" CFIC refueling demonstrations.

Have you ever been involved in an air refueling mishap? Limping home with a crumpled ice shield or broken receptical door can be embarrassing — occasionally, the unlucky air refueling participants are not fortunate enough to make it home. We are now in our third decade of jet aerial refueling, and some continue to do it wrong. The CFIC faculty certainly does not pretend to know all the answers, but perhaps we can share some experience which we have picked up since we opened our doors in 1961.

CFIC has five basic groups of Air Refueling demonstrations. They are designed to analyze the *communications, aerodynamic factors,* and *control techniques* associated with air refueling. Thorough knowledge of these three areas should provide the pilots and boom operators with the essential tools to prevent air refueling mishaps. The following specific demonstrations are part of the CFIC curriculum outlined in SACM 51-135, Vol V:

A. Tanker Power Management.

B. Aerodynamic Effects of the Boom.

C. Simulated Loss of Tanker Engine during Air Refueling.

D. Whifferdill (Constant Attitude, Airspeed, and Altitude Changes while in contact).

E. Effect of Various Closures.

This article will discuss the first demonstration, Tanker Power Management. Future CFIC Corner articles will cover the remaining demonstrations.

Tanker Power Management:

"OK Tanker Toad, just leave your throttles alone so I can get my fuel!" That is a real indication of a lack of team effort. Each member of the refueling team needs a complete understanding of what effect his or her actions have on the outcome of the air refueling. The purpose of the Tanker Power Management demonstration is to show the relative effect of small tanker power changes on the receiver. These power changes will be made with the receiver in the contact position and at a distance assumed to be well clear (300 feet in trail). It is a two part demonstration consisting of tanker limits and the 300 foot demonstration.

Tanker Limits:

The first part of the demonstration begins with the receiver in contact with 0° azimuth, 30° elevation, and 12 feet extention. Once the receiver pilot is stable, power is set and no further throttle movements are made. The tanker pilot then reduces inboard throttles by ½ knob width and a slow rate of closure develops. As the receiver reaches 9 feet extention, the tanker pilot will increase the inboard throttles one knob width. The receiver will then stop at 8 feet and the inboard throttles will be returned to the original setting. Similar power changes are made to move the receiver back to 16 feet. With the receiver stable at 16 feet the tanker copilot will turn the anti-ice switch on. With this almost imperceptible power reduction caused by engine bleed, the receiver will begin closing. At 12 feet the receiver will stop the closure when the anti-ice is turned off. After seeing this, it is easy to see why receiver pilots want the tanker pilot to leave the power alone (and why they use the term "Tanker Toad" when it isn't left alone). Is it feasible then to always just set the tanker power and never make a change? Unfortunately not. There are basically two situations in which a tanker power change must be made to control airspeed within acceptable limits IAW SACR 60-4, Vol IV (with a B-52, 245 to 270 KIAS tanker autopilot ON or 240 to 275 KIAS autopilot OFF).* These changes are made during offloads and during changing atmospheric conditions (eg. crossing a significant pressure ridge). Tanker pilot techniques discussed in the dash three work very well for offloads, and when verbal coordination with the receiver is not necessary. During a change of atmospheric conditions which requires power adjustments by the tanker, verbal coordination with the receiver has proven very helpful. The position of the receiver when the tanker pilot makes the power change is also important. We demonstrate this with the infamous "300 foot" demonstration.

300 Foot Demonstration:

When does a good tanker pilot make a power change? Sorry receiver pilots, "never" is not an acceptable answer due to reasons previously discussed. "After the receiver backs out" is another popular answer, but not necessarily a very good one. The 300 foot demonstration shows why.

To begin this demonstration, the bomber will stabilize at approximately 300 feet behind the tanker, simulating a seat change. The tanker pilot will simulate being a little high on airspeed and make a small power reduction (200-300 pounds per engine). Initially, very little, if any, closure is perceived. It takes approximately one minute for the receiver to close to 200 feet. Fifteen seconds later the receiver is at 100 feet with the power at idle and still closing. Within a few seconds the boom operator calls a breakaway. In order to effect separation, the bomber must lower his gear. The entire maneuver takes less than a minute and a half, and the tanker has only lost 3 to 4 KIAS. After seeing this eye opening demonstration, it is obvious that this is not the best time for a power change. Especially if receiver pilots or boom operators are making a seat change and their attention is distracted. It also convinces boom operators to closely monitor the receiver even though the receiver has backed out to a presumably safe distance.

After verbal coordination, a small tanker power change, made while the receiver is in the contact position, is regarded as the safest and most effective one. Relative movement is easiest for the receiver to see and there is the added assistance of the pilot director lights. Large power changes, over ½ knob width, should never be required if the tanker pilot stays "ahead of the aircraft".

Remember these are *CFIC only demonstrations* and they require thorough coordination between the tanker pilot, bomber pilot, and boom operator. All SAC units have several CFIC graduates who can further elaborate on the demonstrations in "hangar flying" sessions. CFIC missions include a thorough air refueling coordination briefing on mission planning day and a thorough critique following the mission which involves both bomber and tanker pilots and boom operators. The key to successful air refueling is communicating effectively. Keeping lessons learned from CFIC demonstrations privileged information is definitely not our objective. Spread the word!

NOTE: Watch for future CFIC Corner articles and you will learn the secret of the "Whiff". Questions on the CFIC Air Refueling demonstrations may be directed to any CFIC instructor pilot or boom operator at Castle AFB, CA, AV 347-2235 or at Carswell AFB, TX, AV 739-5216.

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*The B-52 can safely refuel at normal training grossweights at airspeeds from 220 KIAS to 300 KIAS. However, due to airframe life, mission timing, and cell formation requirements a qualified tanker pilot should be able to maintain SACR 60-4 tolerances while providing a smooth, fluid platform for the receiver.

Missile Mishap Report

DOD CLASS A, B and C



A-CIRCUIT VAULT DOOR DAMAGE

The A-circuit vault door was positioned under the maintenance equipment trailer and on the side of the A-circuit pit away from the personnel access hatch. A security escort pulled the vault door to the right rear corner of the maintenance equipment trailer to insert the new combination. After the combination change, the trailer was repositioned to facilitate hoist use. The vault door was once again moved between the A-circuit pit and the edge of the personnel access hatch and was left standing on tripod legs. After completion of maintenance a maintenance team member accidentally hit the top heavy door and the door tipped and fell 30 feet into the personnel access hatch. The resulting fall of the door pulled the cable assembly from the A-circuit pit junction box and damaged the lower telescoping ladder, ladder bracket and vault door. Fortunately, no one was beneath the door at that time. Improper positioning of the vault door adjacent to the primary access hatch shaft resulted in this personnel error mishap. Estimated cost of damages is $2,230.96.

DAMAGED RV ACCESS DOOR

During the performance of maintenance (missile guidance section recycle) at a launch facility, the RV access door was stored in the safe-arm pin container which remained on the elevator work cage. After the missile components had been restacked, it was discovered that the RV access door was broken into two pieces. Due to a number of extenuating circumstances at the time of the missile guidance recycle, it was impossible to determine exactly when or how the door was broken. It was speculated that the door was either crushed between the work cage and work cage extension legs or else crimped between the work cage and launch tube wall. Placing the RV access door in the area of the work cage is ill advised as space restrictions do not allow sufficient clearance to preclude this type of damage. Once again we add another missile mishap up to personnel error.

1979 Flying Safety Rate


SAC CLASS A MISHAP RATE (PER 100,000 FLYING HRS)

MISHAPS	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1979	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	

1979 SUBORDINATE CMD RATES



MISHAP STATUS

B-52H	JAN 79
KC - 135Q	APR 79
RC - 135	AUG 79
FB-111	SEP 79
KC-135	SEP 79

A KEY TO MISHAP PREVENTION

Captain Jack Adler
22 BMW, March AFB

I would like to relate two cases that would appear to be completely unrelated. In reality, however, they are very closely related. Let's see if you can spot the relationship.

Case number one. Nummy 11 had just started engines prior to takeoff. The crew chief failed to properly clear the area behind the aircraft and when power was increased to taxi out of the parking stubb, a chock was blown back into a maintenance stand. From a distance, there didn't appear to be any damage. After the aircraft taxied out, the crew chief checked the stand. He found that a wheel on the stand had been broken. The estimated cost to repair was $12 for materials and one man-hour labor. A supervisor on the line, after surveying the damage and noting its "insignificance," told the crew chief, "Don't worry about it. It's not reportable anyway, so there's no need to tell safety about it."

Case number two. During a fighter deployment operation across the Pacific Ocean, a fighter flew close formation with the tanker to allow a passenger on the tanker a better opportunity to take some pictures. How close, you ask. The fighter was inboard of the left inboard engine and slightly below the fuselage. Yes, Virginia, that's mighty close. Aerodynamic forces being what they are, the two aircraft collided in what could be called an aviation fender bender. Total damage was a little under $4,000. This mishap required a safety report. Unfortunately, when the aircrews talked to the Flying Safety Investigation Board, they fabricated details about what had actually happened.

Here we had two apparently unrelated mishaps. Although both are classified "flight mishaps," one occurred on the ground and one in the air. One was reportable to higher headquarters and one was not. What then, is the common denominator in these two occurrences? In both cases the involved individuals failed to give the safety investigators proper information either by not reporting it at all or by giving false information.

Flying safety investigations are conducted in accordance with AFR 127-4 for the purpose of mishap prevention. Let me repeat that: FLYING SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS are conducted ONLY FOR MISHAP PREVENTION PURPOSES. Flying safety investigations do not assign liability for mishaps. The sole purpose of these investigations, i.e., mishap prevention, is accomplished through in-depth investigations resulting in the determination of all causal factors culminating in the formulation of meaningful recommendations to prevent recurrence of the mishap.

Although the entire process from initial investigation to recommendations is essential to the USAF and SAC mishap prevention programs, there is one key element that is a necessity for the process to begin. That key is notification to the safety office. Notification is made up of two parts: (1) advising the safety office that the mishap has occurred as soon as possible; and (2) complete disclosure to the safety investigator.

There may be several reasons for failing to notify the safety office that a mishap has occurred; none of which is acceptable. What happened may seem insignificant (remember our $12 maintenance stand



wheel) and 'probably not reportable anyway.' While it is true that not all mishaps are reportable to HHQ, none are insignificant. Even those not reportable are investigated to determine if there is a better procedure that could be used to insure a similar event doesn't recur as a major mishap.

Another reason for failing to notify safety is, "Well, it's really not my job to notify safety." This is incorrect because safety is everyone's job; from the highest level of command (the commander) to the lowest level of command (the individual).

Another good one is, "I'm sure George will make the proper notifications." My only reply to that one is: I wonder what George is thinking.

I'm sure we can all think of many more reasons but the bottom line is that none of them is satisfactory. We must all insure that the safety office is advised when a mishap has occurred; whether it is directly or through the unit commander or his designated safety personnel or through job control/command post.

The second part of notification is as important as the first. Without complete disclosure to the safety investigator, the investigation will be deficient and the recommendations may be erroneous or ineffective.

The USAF (and SAC) policy recognizes that complete candid disclosure to the safety investigator is essential for an effective flight mishap prevention program. In an effort to encourage candid disclosure, the Air Force has attached a privileged status to information given to a safety investigator regarding a flight mishap. This privilege of confidentiality extends to all reports, documents and statements pertaining to flying safety investigations. I'd like to quote paragraph 2-5c of AFR 127-4 to explain the extent of this privilege of confidentiality as it applies to flying safety LIMITED USE reports:

"These reports and their attachments may not be used as evidence for disciplinary action, nor as evidence in determining the misconduct or line of duty status of any personnel. Using them as evidence before flying evaluation boards or to determine pecuniary liability is also prohibited."

It should be evident from this quoted paragraph that the sole purpose of flying safety investigations is mishap prevention. Complete investigations with full, honest disclosure to the safety investigator is essential to the formulation of meaningful recommendations in order to preclude recurrence.

It is vitally important that we all understand the importance of, and our responsibilities for, notification to the safety office regarding the occurrence of a mishap. It is unimportant whether the occurrence is a major mishap or an insignificant event. The occurrence of a minor mishap indicates the potential for a major mishap.

Flying safety investigations cannot erase mishaps that have occurred but they can prevent recurrence of the same or more severe mishaps. One key to mishap prevention program is NOTIFICATION. Don't forget to use it.

PROFESSIONAL PERFORMERS

Individuals selected for these pages as SAC's top professional performers of the month are chosen from nominations made by all SAC units. Selection is made only after all nominations have been carefully screened and those chosen meet the highest standards of excellence outlined in AFR 127-2/SS1.



Minuteman Crew

1Lt John A. Butler and 2Lt Gregory A. Frushour, Crew R-045, 351 SMW, has been named Crew of the Month for their sustained superior performance and exemplary efforts.

While on alert, Lieutenants Butler and Frushour averted potentially severe equipment damage and prolonged degrade of alert status by shutting down the LCC due to complications related to the supply of equipment cooling air. With several maintenance teams in the LCC and LCEB troubleshooting environmental control system problems, the crew detected smoke being exhausted from forced air equipment racks while operating on the emergency air conditioning unit. Unable to obtain air from other sources, the crew reacted with sound judgment and pinpoint accuracy in removing all power and promptly relaying indications to the appropriate agencies. According to maintenance personnel, their decisive action prevented serious damage to the equipment and enabled regained operation in a timely manner. The talent, dedication and professionalism of Crew R-045 exemplify the highest standards of the SAC crew force and well merit their selection for Minuteman Crew of the Month.

Titan Crew

Crew R-064, Little Rock AFB, is named Combat Crew of the Month. Crewmembers are 1Lt John Hamburg, Jr., MCCC; 2Lt Kenneth G. Eide, DMCCC; SSgt Charles R. Huffman, Jr., MSAT; and Sgt Angela A. Butcher, MFT.

An explosion and fire occurred at a complex in the main power distribution center on level three of the missile complex silo. The crew quickly responded in a timely, professional manner, demonstrating exceptional technical knowledge and bravery. The two enlisted crewmembers, using self-contained breathing equipment, entered the dark and smoky silo and proceeded to silo level three and used hand-held fire extinguishers to control a dangerous flaming electrical fire. The MCCC and DMCCC performed superbly under extreme pressure as this serious hazard was controlled without injury. The crew then provided timely information to the missile potential hazard team and directed base support teams in efforts to save equipment and provide portable power and air conditioning units for the next 12 hours. Their quick and decisive actions during an extremely hazardous situation displayed outstanding professionalism and weapon system expertise. Crew R-064 well deserves recognition as SAC Missile Crew of the Month.

28th Bomb Squadron, Robins AFB Crew: P Capt Mike Harvin, CP 1Lt Phillip Martin, RN Capt Wayne Roe, N Capt Jim Roberts, EW Capt Randy Wright, and G Sgt Jim Jackson.

Flying Crew

During a recent training sortie, the 28th Bomb Squadron crew of Capt Mike Harvin did an outstanding job of coping with a massive fuel leak which resulted from major engine damage on a B-52G aircraft. While refueling to maximum inflight gross weight, the tanker boom operator notified the bomber crew that their number one pod was leaving a contrail. After disconnect the pilot made a visual inspection of the pod and confirmed that fuel was streaming from all joints in the cowlings to the extent that number one engine mount area, and wing were all wet with escaping fuel. During this same period the copilot noted a 1000-pound per minute decrease in the number one main fuel tank. Realizing the extreme danger of fire and possible loss of the aircraft the pilots shut down the number one and two engines and declared an emergency with ATC. The radar navigator and navigator revised a flight plan to return the aircraft to Robins without overflying heavily populated areas. The electronic warfare officer notified home station of the problem. The seriousness of the problem was compounded by the fact that the aircraft was at maximum gross weight and fuel management became critical. After three hours in the local area burning down fuel to landing weight, a six-engine penetration to an ILS final completed the successful recovery. Inspection of the aircraft revealed massive damage to engine number two which occurred when an accessory plate blew off the engine, possibly as the result of an engine compressor stall. The accessory plate punctured the pressurized fuel lines to number two engine and penetrated the firewall separating both engines. Pressurized fuel was being sprayed on the hot sections of both engines in the pod. The crew's excellent knowledge of their aircraft and outstanding coordination of all on board resulted in the safe recovery of the aircraft and well merit their selection as SAC Crew of the Month.

Maintenance NCO

SSgt Michael L. Robicheaux, 380 AMS, Plattsburgh AFB, is SAC Maintenance NCO of the Month. Serving as NCOIC of the Microwave Section, Sgt Robicheaux completely rebuilt the VM-3 attenuator and signal calibration system resulting in a more reliable calibration standard. He then developed a lesson plan to train laboratory personnel on the use of this complex equipment. Currently he is working with microwave engineers at the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center at Newark AS, Ohio, on a new VM-3 configuration which will reduce equipment setup time by one-third while increasing the system's dynamic range from 80 to 115 decibels. Sgt Robicheaux recently identified errors in the calibration of microwave sweeper systems and determined that a composite calibration should be performed rather than individual calibrations. This increased the system accuracy by four percent while reducing the number of required calibrations by 35%. Sgt Robicheaux is a dedicated NCO and an asset to SAC and the United States Air Force.

1979 COMBAT CREW INDEX

MISHAP PREVENTION — GENERAL

Ops Hazards	Jan-Dec
Leaky Seals	Jan
Fire on Takeoff	Feb
Safety First	Mar
A Million to One	May
Dynamic Duo	May
PTFS	May
Nuclear Safety Revisited	May
Birdstrike on B-52	July
Who's the Flying Safety Officer	Aug
Too Close for Comfort	Oct
Complacency and Nuclear Safety	Nov
No Laughing Matter	Nov
Safety — A People Program	Dec
Key to Mishap Prevention	Dec

TRAINING

AC's View — Giant Thrust II	Jan.
New Concept in B-52 Training	Feb
Ducking Under	May
Low to the Ground	Jun
Airborne at S1	Jul
Red Flag	Aug
Nellis Airfield	Aug
Cold Seat Swap	Aug
Business Effort	Aug
Bullet Blitz 6	Sep
Guam 12 o'clock	Nov
Airborne Proc Trainer	Dec

CREW PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

Big Instrument	Jan-Dec
Timed Alternate Rend	Feb
The New Breed	Feb
Roger Traffic	Mar
Tanker to Rescue	Jun
Strategic Rescue	Jun

ICBM

Missile Mishaps	Jan-Dec
Cookbook Crew	Feb
Job Enrichment	Oct
Captain Hook	Dec

WEATHER

Thunderstorm Avoidance	Mar
Lightning Strikes Again	Jul
Windshear	Jul
Solar Activity	Sep
Casey in Big Snow	Oct
Aircraft Icing	Oct

AWARDS AND PERSONNEL RECOGNITION

Professional Performers	Jan-Dec
SAC Safety Screen	Jan-Dec
Hall of Fame	Jan-Dec
Giant Voice 78	Jan
Olympic Arena 79	Apr
SAC Sweeps Safety Awards	Apr
Year of the Titan	Jun
1978 Safety Awards	Jun
Giant Sword 79	Sep
NSC Awards 78	Oct
Thrill of Victory	Nov

RATES

Flying Safety Rates	Jan-Dec
Missile Mishap Report	Jan-Dec

MAINTENANCE

Maintenance View-Giant Thrust II	Jan
Maintenance Man of Year	Jun

LIFE SUPPORT

Egress Update B-52	Jan
Preparing for Unexpected	Jun
Invisible Equipment	Oct

OTHER FEATURES

ACE Topics	Jan-Dec
R&D Corner	Mar-Nov
CFIC Corner	May-Dec
Ops Update	Feb-Sep
Debrief	Mar-Dec
93 BMW-Castle Story	Feb
170 AREFG-Climb to Top	Mar
On Guns and Bombers	May
19 BMW-Legacy of Triangle	Jun
SAC Command Post	Jul
Another Way to Spell Recce	Aug
Global Shield	Sep
Fish or Cut Bait	Oct
7 BMW-Teamwork and Effort	Dec

EDITORIALS

Common Sense	Jan
Pride	Feb
Preparedness	Mar
Challenge of Competition	Apr
A Command Tradition	Apr
Experience and Readiness	May
The Good Life	Jun
Let's Talk Safety	Jul
Hazard of Being Outstanding	Sep
Keystone to Readiness	Oct
Maintaining National Security	Nov
A License to Judge	Dec

SAC SAFETY SCREEN

384 AREFW, McConnell Crew R-157: P Maj Marlin J. Schaefer, CP 1Lt David A. Hornung, NN Capt Monty S. Hoffsommer, RN Sgt Robert W. Friesen

384 AREFW, McConnell Crew S-101: P Capt David E. Day, CP Capt Thomas R. Blankenbiller, NN Capt Steven A. Hildebrand, RN MSgt Larry M. Watson

305 AREFW, Grissom Crew R-190P: P Capt Robert J. Medved, CP Capt Gary L. Davis, NN 1Lt David W. Webb, RN SSgt David W. Craig

305 AREFW, Grissom Crew E-120: P Capt James A. Logsdon, CP Capt Gary R. Matson, NN Capt William H. Jenkins, RN SSgt James A. Justice

380 BMW, Plattsburgh Crew E-18: P Capt Robert O. Holtz, RN Capt Edward W. Ross

380 BMW, Plattsburgh Crew E-57: P Maj Robert P. Hansen, RN Capt Michael D. Bryant

380 BMW, Plattsburgh Crew S-101: TP Capt James G. Dickensheets, CP Capt Richard T. Island, NN Capt Paul M. Convutsakis, BO TSgt Jack Bracken

380 BMW, Plattsburgh Crew R-183: P Capt Terry L. Godby, CP Capt Gary P. Thaller, NN Capt Charles R. Nardello Jr, BO SrA Scott C. Wallace

44 SMW, Ellsworth Crew E-154: MCCC Capt Timothy K. Roberts, DMCCC 2Lt Gordon T. Headley

321 SMW, Grand Forks Crew S-130: MCCC Capt Paul L. Jones, DMCCC 1Lt Christopher A. Peters

381 SMW, McConnell Crew R-072: MCCC Lt Steven M. Welch, DMCCC Lt Gregory F. Intoccia, BMAT A1C William E. Austin, MFT A1C Eunice Dunne

The SAC Safety Screen is an honor roll of SAC's most professional crews. To gain listing on the Screen, crew members must be nominated by their unit commanders and meet high selection criteria of experience in their aircraft or missile system *IAW AFR127-2/SS1.*

*U.S. Government Printing Office
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HALL OF FAME

TACTICAL FLYING

OVER TWENTY-THREE YEARS

170 AREFG, McGuire (NJANG)	None

OVER TWENTY-ONE YEARS

171 AREFW, Greater Pittsburgh (PAANG)	Mar '58
157 AREFG, Pease (NHANG)	June '58
97 BMW, Blytheville	Aug '58

OVER TWENTY YEARS

940 AREFG, Mather (USAFR)	May '59
307 AREFG, Travis	Sep '59

OVER EIGHTEEN YEARS

151 AREFG, Salt Lake City (UTANG)	Feb '61
161 AREFG, Sky Harbor (AZANG)	Apr '61
126 AREFW, Chicago O'Hare (ILANG)	Apr '61
134 AREFG, McGhee Tyson (TNANG)	Aug '61

OVER SEVENTEEN YEARS

11 SG, Fairford	Feb '62
340 AREFG, Altus	Jun '62
96 BMW, Dyess	Aug '62

OVER SIXTEEN YEARS

19 BMW, Robins	Aug '63

OVER FOURTEEN YEARS

160 AREFG, Rickenbacker (OHANG)	Dec '64
320 BMW, Mather	Jul '65

OVER THIRTEEN YEARS

452 AREFW, March (USAFR)	Sep '66

OVER TWELVE YEARS

92 BMW, Fairchild	Feb '67
55 SRW Offutt	Jul '67
2 BMW, Barksdale	Aug '67

OVER TEN YEARS

5 BMW, Minot	Feb '69
42 BMW, Loring	Sep '69
141 AREFW, Fairchild (WAANG)	Oct '69

OVER NINE YEARS

28 BMW, Ellsworth	May '70

OVER SEVEN YEARS

7 BMW, Carswell	Mar '72
101 AREFW, Bangor (MEANG)	Mar '72
306 SW, Mildenhall	Apr '72
416 BMW, Griffiss	May '72
305 AREFW, Grissom	Aug '72

OVER SIX YEARS

379 BMW, Wurtsmith	Apr '73

OVER FIVE YEARS

931 AREFG, Grissom (USAFR)	Feb '74
384 AREFW, McConnell	Mar '74
189 AREFG, Little Rock (ARANG)	May '74

OVER FOUR YEARS

43 SW, Andersen	Dec '74
68 BMW, Seymour Johnson	Sep '75

ICBM

OVER FIFTEEN YEARS

90 SMW, F E Warren	Jul '64
1 STRAD, Vandenberg	Sep '64

OVER FOURTEEN YEARS

308 SMW, Little Rock	Aug '65

OVER NINE YEARS

341 SMW, Malmstrom	Apr '70

OVER SIX YEARS

390 SMW, Davis-Monthan	Jul '73

OVER FIVE YEARS

351 SMW, Whiteman	Oct '74
91 SMW, Minot	Nov '74

To gain listing in the Hall of Fame a SAC or AFR unit must be Class A mishap-free for 48 months